the regime at the implementation stage. The way that negotiators resolved their differences and reached consensus at Stockholm holds lessons not only for future toxics treaties, but also for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) generally. This paper focuses on the story of the POPs negotiations, the treaty they generated, and the lessons that can be learned from that experience. In Part II, I present the problem of persistent organic pollutants, discussing their global impacts on human and animal health, particularly on women and young children. In Part III, I discuss the growth of international concern over POPs, spurred by research into endocrine disruption and other health effects, and the way that this awareness developed into a mandate to construct a global POPs treaty. In Part IV, I discuss tensions inherent in environmental treaty negotiations, examine the negotiating stages of the POPs treaty process, and highlight important debates between participants. In Part V, I examine factors that suggest the likely success of the POPs treaty, focusing on aspects of the negotiation process that apply broadly in other global, environmental contexts, and conclude that the Stockholm Convention teaches important lessons about effective environmental treaty development.
I. The Emerging Problem of Persistent Organic Pollutants
Scientists have been concerned about the effects of persistent organic pollutants for many years. After World War II, Americans became concerned over increased domestic pesticide use, the extremely toxic nature of these chemicals, and the scale on which they were being used. 4 In 1962, Rachel Carson gave shape and substance to these apprehensions with Silent Spring, 5 an early call to heed the effects of synthetic pesticides. Employing a style that would typify environmental advocacy for years to come, Carson told a story of a countryside silenced by invisible, poisonous pesticides, providing the impetus for much of the environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s. 6 This influential story instilled awareness and galvanized public opinion in the United States 7 through graphic During this era, accumulation of toxic substances in the Great Lakes aquatic system and negative health impacts in wildlife species brought the subject home for many Americans who had been skeptical of Carson's strong warnings. 10 Officials in the first Bush Administration soon came to understand the fundamental danger posed by the levels of toxic exposure experienced by Americans.
11
Great Lakes residents began to believe that they were being exposed to higher levels of toxic chemicals than people in other regions of the country, as they witnessed the damage wrought by accumulation of toxic chemicals.
12 Throughout this period, discoveries that other chemicals once considered safe-such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)-could be deadly to humans prompted American policymakers to enact several statutes banning or severely restricting the use of these substances as well. 13 Pesticide poisonings in South and Central America put the international community on alert about synthetic chemicals, and raised the specter of concern 11. See Gordon K. Durnil, The Making of a Conservative Environmentalist (1995). As a Bush appointee to the U.S.-Canada International Joint Committee for Water Quality, Durnil assessed scientific evidence of Great Lakes contamination and interviews with thousands of individuals and determined that toxic chemicals indeed posed a significant threat to human health, compiling his findings in a book: "consequences to humans and their children cannot even be predicted. However, the increased risks of cancer to the exposed adult and, more worrisome, the effects on the unborn progeny of the exposed, are frightening." Id. at 86.
12. Theo Colborn et al., Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening Our Fertility, Intelligence, and Survival?-A Scientific Detective Story 15 (1996) . As the authors recount, concern over the Great Lakes region escalated further in 1969 when the Cuyahoga River caught fire, Lake Erie was pronounced "dead," and scientists judged that other lakes were also seriously endangered. Id. at 13-14.
13. Lallas, supra note 10, at 90; see also, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(e) (2000) . over pesticides used in agriculture.
14 In 1984, the release in Bhopal, India, of a cloud of deadly pesticide gas (methyl isocyanate) killed thousands, and inspired international appreciation for the dangers associated with pesticides. 15 With the increase in international trade, appreciation of the dangers of pesticides became more acute in the United States because of the pesticide "circle of poison." 16 The circle of poison refers to the observed cycle whereby pesticides that have been banned domestically are exported to other countries and applied to agricultural export crops. 17 Often the countries importing the pesticides are developing nations, where problems arise due to unsafe handling and storage practices, as well as improper labeling. 18 When regulating countries, such as the United States, then import the pesticide-bearing crops, the circle is complete, and consumers in these developed countries risk exposure to the invisible poisons, despite domestic laws written to protect them. 19 Thus, the circle of poison highlights the need for international controls on pesticides, POPs, and other toxic chemicals.
POPs are hazardous and potentially life-threatening organic compounds, whose designation comes from their chemical characteristics. POPs are difficult to break down, since they resist photolytic, chemical, and biological degradation. 20 As a result, POPs persist in the environment, and would continue to pollute the earth for many years to come, even if releases were to cease immediately. 21 POPs also accumulate in the fatty tissues of living beings, due to their persistence, low water solubility, and high lipid solubility. 22 As a result, POPs tend to biomagnify in food systems, accumulating in high levels in organisms at the top of the food chain, rendering them the most susceptible to potential adverse health effects. 23 Today, POPs are ubiquitous; scientists have found them in measurable levels in living organisms, 24 including in human blood and breast milk, across the globe. 25 POPs' persistence and their volatility also allow them to move around the world, transported by both air and water currents. 26 The "grasshopper effect," whereby POPs move in hopping fashion due to variations in climate and temperature, 27 has allowed POPs to reach areas in the high Arctic, far away from any industrial application. 28 As a result, even indigenous peoples of the Arctic face exposure to these chemicals in amounts that exceed tolerable intake levels. 29 The pervasiveness of POPs in the global environment would not be so troubling were it not for their danger to human and animal life and their persistence in living organisms. Nine of the twelve POPs identified by the U.N. Environmental Programme (UNEP) for regulation are pesticides, including aldrin, dieldrin, DDT, endrin, chlordane, hexachlorobenzene (HCB), 30 mirex, toxaphene, and heptachlor. 31 Many of these substances are widely recognized as so dangerous that little debate is heard about the need to prohibit or virtually eliminate them. 32 The two other categories of POPs, industrial chemicals and industrial byproducts, consist of PCBs and HCBs, and dioxins and furans, respectively.
33 These chemicals are also known to be toxic to humans at extremely low levels. 34 In general, the "dirty dozen" POPs are acutely or chronically toxic, or are classified as known or probable human carcinogens. 35 POPs are also linked to the learning, developmental, and behavioral disabilities that afflict children. The most important impact of POPs-one that has emerged only recently in studies and the popular press-may well be non-cancer risks associated with exposure.
37 Rachel Carson's Silent Spring warned of these so-called endocrinedisrupting effects of DDT, which led to the rapid decline in bird populations in the 1960s. 38 The authors of Our Stolen Future 39 sounded a similar alarm with regard to endocrine disruption, exploring possible links between exposure to extraordinarily low levels of POPs and disruptions in animal and human hormone systems, including the male and female sex hormones responsible for fetal development. 40 Endocrine disruption studies present evidence of reproductive and immune system damage 41 occurring during pregnancy, when endocrinedisrupting chemicals mimic or block signals sent to a developing fetus to guide its development. 42 Disruption during this stage is thought to lead to serious problems as the offspring develops, including, cancer, endometriosis, learning disorders, behavioral disorders, low sperm count, and genital malformations. 43 Additionally, endocrine-disrupting chemicals have effects on developing fetae at different "developmental windows" and dosages, which makes estimating their effects extremely problematic. 44 These chemicals also appear to have additive, synergistic effects that do not appear until the offspring reach puberty. 45 Due to these factors, and the ability of POPs to bioaccumulate in fatty tissue and trans- mit from mother to child through fetal development or breast milk, 46 endocrine disruptions present significant potential dangers for human populations with extensive exposure to these pollutants. 47 This fact is particularly troubling in light of findings that POPs are found around the globe 48 in measurable amounts that may be sufficient to cause significant endocrine disruption. 49 The research on endocrine disruption is still in its early stages, and there is still no scientific consensus about how endocrine disruption affects human health.
50
Despite compelling evidence implicating chemical contamination in the disruption of certain fish and wildlife endocrine systems, "the relationship of human diseases of the endocrine system and exposure to environmental contaminants is poorly understood and scientifically controversial." 51 This lack of consensus reflects both the relatively recent nature of the research on endocrine disruption and constraints involved in constructing experiments on human beings. Information on human effects is also limited due to scarcity of data on concentrations of contaminants in human embryos and the lack of multi-generational exposure studies that simulate ambient concentrations. 52 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence about effects on human systems from chemical contamination, observed and welldocumented effects on wildlife species provide the incentive for prophylactic regulation that could prevent further exposure to these dangerous compounds.
Due in part to the advocacy of domestic environmental groups, developed countries have already banned or restricted several of the POPs discussed here. 53 However, POPs are exported to non-regulating countries, where they are used for 46 agricultural and related pest-control applications. 54 Use of the pesticide POPs in agriculture leads to poisoning among farm workers, who are often uninformed about the dangers posed by these chemicals. 55 Results from this exposure can include sterility, 56 cancer, miscarriages, deformed babies, and even death for farm workers. 57 POPs are especially devastating in the developing world, where countries often lack the capacity to regulate POPs domestically. 58 Worse still, pesticide POPs have been included in aid packages to developing countries, despite known or suspected negative health effects. 59 Writers describing exports of hazardous chemicals have labeled this practice "environmental racism,"-the behavior by which some humans are treated worse than others, and forced to live under environmental conditions that the more powerful would never accept. 60 The extreme poverty of developing nations creates a dynamic in which the states accept dangerous chemicals-either for disposal or deposit onto export crops-because they 54 
II. Evolution of Global Concern over POPs
As indicated above, many POPs were banned in the United States and nations of Western Europe after initial concern over their effects surfaced in the 1970s. 63 Regional bans, including a series of initiatives in the North Sea and other regions of Europe, among the countries of the European Union represent other attempts to regulate POPs on a broader scale. 64 Regional bans were also implemented in North America as part of a series of initiatives to take action against toxic chemicals in the Great Lakes ecosystems. 65 In 1995, Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed to a Resolution on the Sound Management of Chemicals under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which called for the development of action plans to address problems posed by persistent toxic substances. 66 Despite the progress they represent, however, regional bans are limited in their potential effectiveness against chemicals with the properties of POPs. 67 One reason is that developing countries tend not to become parties to these regional bans, which means that the chemicals may still be imported into those countries without prohibition. Further, through evidence of long-range 61 transport of POPs, in conjunction with information about their persistence and toxicity, policymakers and societies have become more aware of the transboundary nature of toxic problems, and the resulting implications for global environmental systems. 68 Thus, increased understanding of the dangers of POPs, and the realization that they do not respect national or continental boundaries, contributed to the consensus that international regulation was necessary.
A. International Action on POPs
Concerted international action on the problem of POPs began in the 1990s. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit marked a step forward in international cooperation to reduce the dangers of POPs and other toxic chemicals. 69 In Rio, members of the international community joined together to develop a set of principles on the environment and development, along with an action plan entitled Agenda 21.
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Chapter 19 of Agenda 21 targets POPs, calling for actions that include "phasing out or banning [toxic chemicals] that pose an unreasonable and otherwise unmanageable risk to the environment or human health and those that are toxic, persistent and bio-accumulative. . . ."
71 Agenda 21 also called for further action to promote prior informed consent, which foreshadowed the negotiation of a global treaty to regulate information on international shipments of hazardous substances.
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The concept of Prior Informed Consent (PIC) grew out of international concern about the growing chemical trade. PIC reflects the notion that international shipment of a pesticide that is banned or severely restricted in order to protect human health or the environment should not proceed without the agreement of a competent national authority in the importing country. 73 74 The International PIC Code, along with the 1987 UNEP guidelines, was designed to increase access to information regarding hazardous chemicals for all states. 75 These documents, and the international concern that inspired them, led eighty nations to negotiate and sign the Rotterdam PIC Convention in September 1998. 76 The PIC Convention is premised upon the goal of promoting shared responsibility between importers and exporters over the health and environmental risks associated with hazardous substances. 77 One disadvantage of the International PIC Code is that it is voluntary, and does not contain any mechanisms to ensure compliance; rather, it relies upon the collaborative efforts of actors in international trade to guarantee its success. 78 Another major disadvantage of the PIC procedure generally is that the system does not develop the regulatory expertise of the developing countries; instead, it requires officials from such countries to "sign off" on shipments about which they really know very little. 79 Despite its limitations, however, the Rotterdam PIC Convention makes an important contribution to global chemicals management by drawing attention to those substances that cause the greatest harm, disseminating information about the harms caused by these substances, and facilitating national decisionmaking on chemical imports. 80 Along with the notion of PIC, the dangers of POPs have emerged in the years since the Rio Summit as a top priority in the international community. 81 Momen-tum to confront the dangers from POPs grew with the creation of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) in 1994 in Stockholm, Sweden. 82 A year later, the UNEP conference in Washington on land-based sources of marine pollution called for international action to reduce or eliminate POPs.
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UNEP led the way toward creating the first global treaty on POPs, calling for an international assessment process for POPs in 1995. 84 In 1996, the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) held a weeklong meeting in Manila at which technical experts presented recommendations for developing a legally binding global treaty on POPs. 85 Then, in February 1997, the IFCS presented its findings to the international community, gathered at a meeting of the UNEP Governing Council. This led to a legal mandate to negotiate a binding multinational treaty, focusing exclusively on the initial twelve POPs for immediate action, 86 and agreeing to finalize the treaty by the year 2000. 87 In early 1997, UNEP adopted Decision 19/13, recommending that the Governing Council establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to negotiate a glo-82. See IFCS Website, at http://www.who.int/ifcs. The IFCS, which served as a forum for highlevel international environmental policymakers, was to play a critical role in developing a mandate for negotiating the POPs convention. Lallas, supra note 10, at 108. 89 It was through these vehicles that the primary negotiations for the POPs occurred, and their story is the story of the POPs experience.
B. Early POPs Issues
From the outset, POPs presented a number of substantive issues that negotiators of a global treaty had to resolve. The parties first had to identify guiding principles for the negotiations. Perhaps the most important of these principles was how to present the need for caution in response to the significant uncertainty surrounding POPs and their effects, and whether to refer to a "precautionary principle" explicitly in the agreement. 90 Another important issue early on was how quickly to eliminate the use of POPs with continuing beneficial uses. 91 While an immediate ban on many of the POPs would be the most extreme-and likely the most environmentally beneficial control strategynegotiators recognized the need to develop viable alternatives to the chemicals that could be made widely available.
92 Another important early issue facing negotiators was how to ensure the careful and efficient management of existing stocks of POPs to ensure that they would not be traded illegally or misused. 92. Chen, supra note 20, at 134-35 (discussing bans and restrictions of POPs). The debate over DDT, discussed below, was particularly strong with regard to this point.
93. In the wake of the Montreal Protocol, a black market in CFCs has developed which is thought to be second in significance only to the international trade in illegal narcotics. See Elizabeth R. smithjo
The participation of developing countries in the negotiation and implementation of the POPs regime arose as another fundamental issue in the early part of the negotiation process. Initial questions concerned whether the "short list" of POPs identified for regulation even reflected the priorities of governments of the developing world, whose greatest concern centered on other substances with greater acute toxicity to workers, but insufficient persistence to be considered POPs. 94 Deeper questions involved how to address the special needs of developing countries in implementing global environmental treaties, and how to incorporate these perspectives into the developing POPs regime. 95 From the outset, it was clear to policymakers and observers alike that financial and technical assistance would have to be provided to developing countries to enable the countries to find alternatives and re-tool their manufacturing facilities.
96 Structuring participation by developing countries throughout the POPs regime negotiation process also presented a formidable obstacle to negotiating an effective treaty. The way that negotiators were able to overcome these obstacles and craft a treaty regime that is likely to be successful at reducing the dangers from global POPs yields many lessons, both for the immediate POPs problem and for future international environmental agreements.
III. Confronting Tensions in International Environmental Law
Prior to the first multinational environmental conference in Stockholm in 1972, many developing countries did not accept the necessity of global cooperation to protect the environment. 97 During the Stockholm Convention, many unindustrialized countries of the global South suspected that the wealthy nations 94. Lallas, supra note 10, at 112. 95. The concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" for developing countries implementing international environmental agreements was developed as part of the Rio Declaration. Rio Declaration, supra note 90, princ. 7.
96. Cowling, supra note 54, at 272-73 (asserting that a worldwide ban was needed for POPs and making its success contingent upon the provision of "extensive support to the developing world"). (2000) (discussing the danger of a black market in CFCs but concluding that it does not pose a long-term threat to the health of the Protocol system); see also Emory, supra note 17 at 53 (discussing the "huge challenges" these illegal CFC imports present to the operation of effective domestic or international environmental protection programs).
of the North subordinated foreign economic development to environmental protection, "considering the former less urgent than pollution and nature protection."
98 These developing countries "feared that funds previously dedicated to development would be diverted to fight environmental deterioration," resulting in a net loss of funds set aside for the South. 99 In addition, developing countries expressed concerns that environmental provisions could be used by industrialized states to impose restrictions on exports from the South, effectively barring access to worldwide markets. 100 Prior to the 1972 Convention, states in the global South also generally rejected the notion that environmental resources are global assets, subject to global protection. 101 The idea that these resources constitute common heritage is considered hypocritical by developing countries who have witnessed the manner in which industrialized nations in the North are depleting their own natural resources, often more quickly than resources are being depleted in the developing world.
102 Finally, states in the South fear that environmental protection, especially of scarce natural resources, is an "unaffordable luxury" that the industrialized North is trying to convince them to purchase. 103 From these first manifestations to the present, international environmental law has been marked by tension between the abstract environmental concerns of the North and the specific development needs of the South. 104 In an attempt to reconcile the competing global interests over environmental issues, negotiators at the 1972 Stockholm Convention coined the term "sustainable development," which has proved to be as ambiguous as the problem that inspired it.
105 Governments of developing countries have been suspicious of this twist in the environmental debate-South as co-conspirator in harm to the global environmentand have expressed their ire at constraints implicit in the concept of sustainable development. 106 In this way, global environmental debates are marked by tension between rich and poor, developed and undeveloped 107 -tension mediated by the illusory notion of sustainable development.
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This friction is often borne out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Despite the fact that environmental regimes can and do generate broad participation in some instances, developing countries often characterize these treaties, and the globalizing forces that bring them about, as a new form of colonialism. 109 Thus, environmental treaties are often viewed as the means through In many treaty contexts, this division can lead to insurmountable obstacles to negotiating treaty language, and indeed can prevent countries from reaching any consensus at all. The Basel Convention, which attempts to regulate the international movement of hazardous wastes, is an example of treaty negotiations that have been significantly hampered by the North-South divide.
110 During the drafting of the documents that would become the Basel Convention in early 1989, delegates disagreed over numerous issues, including the question of prior informed consent (PIC) and even the definition of hazardous waste.
111 More basic, however, was the Basel Convention's failure to ban the exportation of hazardous wastes. Instead of an outright ban, the Convention attempts to regulate the exportation and handling of hazardous waste through a set of integrated international and national standards.
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The regulation approach to managing hazardous waste imports and exports was rejected by numerous African states in particular, which view hazardous waste exportation to Africa as a crime against African people.
113 Due to the lack of technical expertise and administrative capabilities of many African nations, these states are particularly susceptible to illegal dumping, a phenomenon all too com- mon in Africa. 114 In response to widespread dumping and concerns that "business as usual" would not be abated by the Basel Convention, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Bamako Convention, with the intention of banning all importation of hazardous waste into Africa. 115 Perhaps the most significant feature of the Bamako Convention was its complete ban on imports of hazardous wastes from non-parties 116 (i.e. non-African states), which had been the most contentious issue in the ratification of the Basel Convention. While the dispute over whether or not to ban the export of hazardous wastes from industrialized countries to Africa did not prevent the OAU states from sending delegates to, and signing the final text of, the Basel Convention, 117 it remains the fundamental difference between the two Conventions. This difference, in conjunction with the widely divergent definitions of hazardous waste to which countries continue to subscribe, will likely prevent either of the hazardous waste conventions from being effective international environmental agreements.
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Perhaps an even better example of the roadblocks that economic and cultural divides pose to multilateral environmental agreements is the Kyoto Protocol, 119 which attempts to address the problem of global warming by setting specific targets and timetables for reducing overall global emissions of green- house gases (GHGs). 120 Despite concerted efforts and extended negotiations among participating parties, no firm targets were included, and the regime has been commonly considered a failure.
121 This perceived lack of success is due in large part to the regime's failure to secure the participation of the developing countries China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, and the resulting failure of domestic ratification in the United States.
122 However, with the ratification of the Protocol by Poland on August 8, 2002, and the European Union's focus on securing the rest of the ratifications, the regime will likely enter into implementation soon, albeit without the participation of several key players.
123
In the POPs context, some negotiations between members of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) illustrated North-South friction, at least on the issue of elimination of DDT.
124 This issue presents the choice between strict regulation or ban (when feasible) on the one hand, and elimination without qualifications on the other. 125 Another divisive issue dealt with funding commitments to the developing world, with parties voicing various institutional, administrative, and oversight concerns.
126 Despite often-daunting divisions, the story of the sessions illustrates how extensive participation from the world health and environmental communities was able to create an atmosphere in which issues could be resolved and significant progress achieved in the regulation of POPs. 
A. Addressing Tension Through Public Participation
UNEP and state parties negotiating the POPs convention sought to address potential tensions by including as many perspectives as possible in the negotiations. One important way in which this was done was through the inclusion of NGOs as observers of the negotiation process. 127 The POPs INC Rules of Procedure created roles for NGOs to take in the negotiations, and many groups took advantage of these opportunities, participating in formal meetings and organizing related events. 128 Prior to the first INC session in Montreal in July 1988, a small group of NGOs combined to form the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), dedicated to a number of common positions with respect to POPs. Made up of international environmental and public health NGOs, IPEN was created to provide a forum for developing country NGOs to participate in the Stockholm POPs negotiations. 129 In fact, in addition to many large NGOs from the North, including Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and others, the vast majority of IPEN member groups hail from developing countries.
130 IPEN member groups represented a broad spectrum of citizens' groups dealing with a range of issues related to environmental and public health. 131 also intervened in the negotiating process, held meetings of participating organizations, and even engaged in demonstrations.
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From the outset, member groups in IPEN organized around a set of principles that developed into their Elimination Platform. 134 The platform articulated IPEN's purpose: to facilitate a systematic, global program of action in which all countries would participate to eliminate POPs and their release into the environment. 135 Because of member groups' efforts, IPEN helped define the terms of the debate over POPs, arguing that the goal of the convention should be elimination of POPs releases, as opposed to "management of risks" that POPs pose to humans, wildlife and ecosystems.
136 IPEN member groups further insisted that the delegates at the negotiating sessions adopt a no-tolerance policy for POPs and work toward their rapid elimination wherever possible. 137 The practical impact of these strong positions on the outcome of the treaty language is evident, when the provisions are examined in this light.
B. Negotiating the POPs Convention

IPEN's position and input made strong impressions upon the tone and rhetoric of the INC's first negotiating session (INC-1), as the opening remarks of Dr. Klaus
Töpfer, 138 Executive Director of UNEP, illustrate, showing the shift from language of "POPs management" to POPs elimination. 139 The first set of meetings ended with delegates adopting the IFCS report and UNEP Decision 19/13C as the man-133. On the first day of negotiations in Montreal, Greenpeace staged a demonstration in which participants donned costumes and displayed signs identifying themselves as "pregnant bellies for the future," in order to highlight POPs' impacts upon women and developing children. date and guiding documents for the treaty regime. 140 While topics such as financial assistance and shared responsibility were raised and discussed at these meetings, concrete concerns about them that would create extreme tension between negotiators in later INC sessions had not yet emerged. In fact, by the end of the weeklong INC-1 session on July 3, 1998, the POPs negotiations were off to a good start, and a significant amount of business was accomplished in the first few days. 141 Even more remarkable was the extensive public participation in INC-1, a theme that would be repeated throughout the negotiations. At the first meeting alone, fifty-five organizations were represented, with close to one hundred participants. 142 Domestically, the POPs negotiations seemed to enjoy strong political support from the Clinton Administration, 143 with a U.S. delegation led from 1998 to 2000 by Brooks Yeager, a well-known environmentalist. 144 Indeed, a general "environmental" policy orientation was part of an image that Bill Clinton and Al Gore fostered during their bid for re-election in 1996. 145 ever, further negotiations would reveal that its position was not always as "green" as the Administration sought to portray.
The second negotiating session of the INC (INC-2) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, during January 1999. This session emphasized concerns for women's and indigenous people's health, and connected concerns over POPs in the environment with data showing harm from exposure to women and other at-risk groups.
147 Health professionals also gathered at INC-2 to discuss the medical science concerns related to POPs, particularly with respect to DDT use and alternatives in controlling malaria. 148 Perhaps most importantly, INC-2 engaged developing countries, educating their delegates about risks and alternatives to POPs, encouraging their participation in the implementation phase of the treaty, and learning about their experiences with pesticide POPs.
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One issue raised at INC-1 would form the basis of some disagreement at later negotiating sessions. The issue of elimination of various POPs, as opposed to mere management of the risks associated with them, divided delegations at INC-2. While most of the 103 governments represented at INC-2, as well as environmental, public health, indigenous peoples, and women-and consumer-focused NGOs, supported "elimination" of POPs as a core goal of the treaty, some governments-specifically those of the United States, Canada, and Australia-and the chemical industry appeared to argue against elimination, even as a long-term goal, for certain POPs. 150 Observers, wary that the ostensibly pro-environment U.S. delegation was avoiding the elimination goal shared by most participants, urged the Administration to work for outright elimination of POPs instead.
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As evidenced through accounts of the early negotiations, NGOs played an important role at INC-2, making interventions on other key points, including the need for safe alternatives to POPs like DDT, information exchange, and transparency, to name a few.
152 Like INC-1, INC-2 ended without significant division over many of the final treaty provisions, marked by rapid education and developing consensus over most of the issues that concerned the negotiators.
C. Emerging Tensions and the DDT Dilemma in Geneva
At the third INC session (INC-3) , held in Geneva, Switzerland on September 4-11, 1999, negotiations over the actual text of the treaty took place. 153 In Geneva, further tensions emerged between various groups and countries participating in the negotiations. Some of this tension crystallized in debates over the pesticide DDT, which many in the media characterized as the most contentious issue in the negotiations. 154 Long banned in the North, DDT is widely regarded as a deadly poison. 155 DDT is used extensively and effectively, however, in combating malaria, a disease that ravages the developing world.
156 While alternatives to DDT-such as synthetic pyrethroids-are readily available, they are more expensive and in some cases less effective than DDT. 157 Many of these alternative chemicals have undergone only limited efficacy testing, and may have more acutely toxic effects than DDT, which is associated with reproductive effects and long-term cancer risks. 158 These factors combined in the treaty negotiations to produce contentious debate about the fate of DDT in the POPs Convention. Despite accounts in the popular press, however, observers of the negotiations indicate that the DDT issue was never framed in a black-andwhite, "to ban or not to ban" debate. 159 Prior to INC-1, the World Health Organization (WHO) had been asked to participate in order to lend its significant public health expertise to the negotiations. 160 Interestingly, the way that the WHO's perspective evolved parallels the way negotiations progressed on the issue of DDT. When the INC-3 talks began, some participants recommended setting a phase-out date for DDT, in the context of a larger set of actions to ensure that efforts to combat malaria were not hindered. 161 This move to ban DDT use was countered by representatives from de-veloping countries, who argued forcefully for DDT's continued use, at least until alternatives become affordable. 162 These countries maintained that DDT's practical and economic effectiveness should exclude it from a complete ban, a perspective that was echoed by some public health officials as well. 163 Amir Attaran, a lecturer at the Harvard Center for International Development, argued that what he perceived to be a campaign to ban DDT, mounted by hundreds of environmental groups, was premised on a naïve mandate to eliminate DDT altogether, without regard for its beneficial applications. 164 Attaran, along with health officials and developing country representatives, emphasized the uncertain nature of much of the science behind what participants knew of POPs' effects, arguing that it is not good health policy to stop a known beneficial use based on uncertain harms. 165 As the negotiations progressed, representatives from developed countries, along with environmental and many public health NGOs from around the world, 166 focused on the need for precaution in addressing DDT. From the start, negotiators agreed on a ban on DDT for agricultural use, while some NGOs debated its use for malaria control. 167 These and other public health and environ- mental groups were represented by IPEN, whose numbers had grown to over 240 member organizations by the end of INC-3. 168 IPEN also counted among its ranks indigenous groups from developing countries across the globe, who added their perspectives to the debate over DDT and the other POPs. At INC-3, WWF shifted away from its phase-out language for DDT, but continued to emphasize alternative strategies for malaria control, including other types of chemical insecticides and integrated vector management, 169 and urged clear commitments to increased funding for malaria control. 170 Health experts related recent knowledge on the process of endocrine disruption and expressed concern over the effects of indoor spraying for mosquitoes-the primary method of employing DDT in combating malaria-but acknowledged DDT's apparent effectiveness and the lack of proven alternatives. 171 In the end, DDT's continued IVM delivers tailor-made, flexible solutions to local malaria problems, while reducing the use of insecticides whenever possible. IVM is based on clear decisionmaking criteria and management procedures that ensure the best local mix of alternative products and methods at any given time. It requires partnerships with other public sectors, with the private sector and with civil society, and it is therefore compatible with the basic principles of WHO's Roll Back Malaria initiative. effectiveness and uncertainty about the universal availability of effective, affordable alternatives to DDT shifted the focus away from a DDT ban towards combating malaria through other means.
UNEP, Progress Report on the Development of a WHO Action Plan for the Reduction of
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While there was some dispute over the elimination issue with regard to DDT, there was considerably more consensus about what to do with the other POPs identified by UNEP. Based on the high degrees of persistence and toxicity of those POPs, scientists were in general agreement about the rest of UNEP's "dirty dozen," which include seven other intentionally produced pesticides, dioxins, PCBs and furans. 173 These compounds have been associated with a wide range of health effects, none of which is balanced by public health applications similar to those of DDT. 174 Worse, many of the other pesticide POPs are significantly more toxic than DDT. 175 In fact, the other pesticide POPs remained in use only because of their availability and relatively low prices, which make them viable options to cash-strapped developing countries. 176 As a result, negotiators agreed without significant debate about the fate of most of these compounds. By the end of INC-3, parties had reached a preliminary agreement to eliminate production and use of the pesticides aldrin, endrin and toxaphene, for which none of the countries indicated an intention to claim an exemption, 177 and to phase out chlordane, dieldrin, heptachlor, mirex and hexachlorobenzene with exemptions for certain countries.
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Industry representatives continued to speak in favor of continued use of PCBs, arguing that the likely excessive costs of replacing equipment, as well as the PCBs' stability and fire-resistant nature, made them the perfect industrial chemical. 179 Concerns of cost alone, however, are insufficient to sustain a challenge to regulation of compounds, such as PCBs that are considered highly toxic, are probable human carcinogens, and lead to numerous reproductive and other health problems. 180 Aside from the DDT issue, a comparison of the risks of further exposure to POPs and the risks of banning their use supports elimination. 181 In the end, no compelling arguments were made for the continued use of the other chemicals, and a comparison of their costs and benefits weighed heavily in favor of phaseouts or complete bans.
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Near the end of INC-3, while many issues had been resolved, great tension remained over other issues, including how to provide technical and financial assistance and the extent to which the precautionary principle should be employed in adding new chemicals to the treaty in the future. 183 In an attempt to establish consensus on the latter issue, a group of experts proposed scientific criteria for adding chemicals to the agreement during the meetings in June and September 1999, using toxicity and capability for long-range transport as principal criteria. 184 However, various delegations, most notably the Australian and EU delegates, disagreed about these provisions. 185 The European Union favored provisions that would make it easier to add new chemicals, even if there were uncertainties about their adverse effects. 186 On the other hand, the Australian delegation, which appears to have been joined by the U.S. and Canadian delegations and industry representatives, favored an approach involving more steps to adding further chemicals, with no reference to a precautionary principle in the Convention. 187 However, statements made later by the U.S. delegation indicat- ing that the concept of precaution "fully informs this treaty" call this characterization into question. 188 Regardless, the question of precaution in the addition of new chemicals would remain contentious through the end of negotiations in Johannesburg the following year.
At the close of negotiations in INC-3, some deliberation still focused on what to do about DDT, and whether its extensive use in malaria mosquito control could be replaced with effective alternatives. 189 But much of the debate that remained was over even more divisive issues that would play themselves out in later negotiations.
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D. Deep-Seated Divisions in Bonn
These issues arose in earnest at the fourth INC session (INC-4), which was held March 20-25, 2000, in Bonn, Germany.
191 During INC-4, many participants shared the perspective that divisions in the negotiations over funding commitments and other issues threatened future progress.
192 IPEN and member organizations identified several other key disputes, including language on elimination and application of the precautionary principle, and were fearful that dissension among parties would threaten the outcome of the negotiations.
193 Clifton Curtis, Director of WWF's Global Toxics Programme, articulated a fear among NGOs that many delegates were "trying to evade their responsibilities as members of the global community" and that the treaty was "being buried under a blanket of arcane language and loopholes."
194 Public health officials from around the world also weighed in on the negotiations, accusing the U.S. delegation of taking an unacceptably weak position, particularly on the elimination question and issues relating to funding and technical assistance for developing 188 (warning that if disputed issues were not resolved, the result would be "a treaty that is not worth the paper it is written on").
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countries. 195 Romeo Quijano, M.D., of the Pesticide Action Network of the Philippines, put it bluntly: "It is time to put the money on the table and decide how to get crucial assistance to the developing countries. . . . Financial and technical assistance must be recognized as an obligation and not just a handout." 196 As they had begun to in earlier INC meetings, negotiators also differed over how to include a precautionary principle with respect to chemicals to be added to the regime after its entry into force. 197 Indeed, negotiations over precaution and the elaboration of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 198 proved to be one of the most contentious issues addressed at these meetings. 199 Many environmental group participants stressed the need to enshrine the "precautionary principle" in international environmental law, focusing on verified effects in animals and the potential for negative health effects in humans. 200 Some public health figures, however, argued that NGOs were employing the precautionary principle to the detriment of Third World health, and questioned the motives of groups that would put the health of people in poor countries "at a very real risk to protect citizens of wealthier nations from a theoretical risk." 201 As they had at previous INC sessions, state delegations also differed in their positions on this issue. The European delegates favored extensive, repeated references to precaution and the "precautionary principle" in the actual text of the treaty. 202 Other state delegations, including those of the United States, Australia and Canada, favored a riskassessment approach with more proof of causality with regard to listing of new chemicals. 203 Despite their efforts, negotiators were once again unable to resolve this issue in the context of INC-4, and the extent to which precaution should be employed in adding new chemicals to the Convention would occupy negotiators in Johannesburg until the final hours of the fifth INC session (INC-5) .
By the end of INC-4, however, most of the delegations had reached fundamental agreement on a majority of the issues confronted in the INC sessions. They had expressed their commitment to elimination of non-DDT POPs, embraced at least one version of the precautionary approach, and agreed on confronting the tough issues POPs regulation posed to the global communityeven if they had not solved them yet. 204 
E. Building Consensus (or Buying Compromise) in Johannesburg
As the debates progressed at INC-5, 205 and more views were shared, groups and delegations worked to establish treaty language that would be universally acceptable. 206 On the issue of adding further chemicals to the treaty, the United States and the European Union, in debates that were watched by the media and policymakers across the world, still disagreed about the application of the precautionary principle to the addition of new chemicals to the Convention. 207 Throughout the entire process, the European Union had proved more progressive and precautionary in its negotiating positions than did the United States. 208 In the final negotiating sessions, the EU delegation proposed that the process of information-gathering should begin as candidate chemicals are identified, hoping to speed up the process of listing new POPs to regulate under the auspices of the Convention. 209 The U.S. proposal-which was advocated by the G-77 nations after strong U.S. lobbying behind the scenes-alarmed some observers of the negotiations, who warned that under this procedure, it was unlikely that new chemicals would be included formally and thus earmarked for bans for at least a decade. 210 Negotiators finally agreed to this proposal, adopting provisions to add new chemicals that resemble the risk-assessment approach advocated throughout by industry and the U.S. and Australian delegations. 211 In this way, application of precautionary language relating to the addition of new chemicals to the Convention was the product of careful compromises reached over the course of long negotiations. 212 In the end, the final version of the Stockholm Convention includes several references to the precautionary principle in the preamble, objectives, and provisions concerning review and listing of additional chemicals. 213 Since it applies the precautionary principle to toxic chemical management in international law, the Stockholm treaty represents an important milestone in international environmental law.
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Even with progress on divisive questions related to DDT and the precautionary principle, negotiating parties at INC-5 faced daunting issues of financial and technical assistance that had yet to be resolved. Throughout the process, it was clear that POPs were of greater concern to developed countries, despite the risks POPs posed to developing countries. 215 understood that funding commitments were essential to secure the participation of poorer countries. Not all developed countries shared this view, however. Indeed, the EU delegation initially opposed funding commitments, arguing against trading funds for compliance. 216 Most delegations expressed concern not about whether to provide technical assistance or to which states it would be distributed, but about the level and the method by which it would be administered. 217 Among these parties, the real debate related to the suitability of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), over which many countries expressed unease. 218 In the end, as part of a political compromise, the GEF was chosen as an interim agency to coordinate financial and technical assistance, with the Conference of the Parties agreeing to revisit the effectiveness of the institution at its first meeting. 220 During this set of meetings, the groundwork was laid for execution of the various provisions of the Convention, including, the review process for specific exemptions, guidance on a number of technical issues, and procedures for reviewing the GEF (the interim funding and technical assistance facility).
221 INC-6 marked the end of the negotiation phase and the beginning of the implementation phase for the new POPs Convention, with delegates working together with a renewed purpose to implement the provisions of the treaty as soon as possible. 
IV. Drawing Lessons from the Stockholm Experience
Participants in the POPs negotiations reached compromise in the final hours of the negotiations in Johannesburg, 223 creating a treaty regime that promises to be the most effective multilateral environmental treaty of the new decade. 224 Indeed, despite the divergent perspectives on POPs witnessed in the context of the negotiations, the final agreement has been accepted and praised by governmental and public health officials, policymakers, and representatives from both environmental groups and the chemical industry. 225 This broad consensus is as rare in international environmental law as it is encouraging. Analysis of the broadly accepted regime that negotiators were able to achieve in the Stockholm Convention yields lessons for future MEAs. Whether or not these lessons apply perfectly in other issue contexts, the experience of the POPs Convention illustrates the progress that can be made on global environmental problems.
A. Limits on Effectiveness and Applicability of POPs Convention
Despite initially positive indications from state parties involved in the negotiations, it is possible that the Stockholm Convention will be less than a complete success. Effective implementation may be circumscribed by shortcomings in ratifying states. The Convention requires that fifty states ratify the treaty before it enters into force, which may prevent meaningful progress from occurring for 223 plementing legislation. 231 In order to fund the interim financial mechanism for the POPs Convention, the Bush Administration in early August, 2002, pledged over $500 million to the GEF over four years to ensure that the GEF's other duties are not neglected while it implements the POPs Treaty. 232 Along with those of thirtyone other countries, the United States' contribution to the GEF will fund the GEF's operations through June 2006, allowing it to continue its important work on biodiversity, climate change, and ozone-depleting substances, while providing additional funds to integrate its new functions under the POPs Convention. 233 To ensure complete participation by the United States, the Senate must act on the implementing legislation-including the Administration's bill and the Chairman's bill, S.2118-in order to implement the provisions for adding new chemicals agreed upon by negotiators at INC-5. 234 In so doing, however, the Senate must work out differences between S.2118 and the Administration's version of the implementing legislation, which left out the provisions for adding new chemicals, envisioning a case-by-case revision of domestic legislation each time a POP was considered for addition to the Convention. 235 This hurdle to future implementation of the Treaty must be addressed and removed by the Senate before effective implementation of the Stockholm Convention can take place. Without these changes to the Administration's proposed legislation, U.S. participation in the Convention is threatened, as is its credibility among other nations in the international regulation of POPs.
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Weaknesses in the Convention text could also inhibit its implementation. One such weakness lies in the POPs Treaty's cost-recognizing provisions, which in some cases could prevent best available technology from being employed. 237 The terms of the Convention are also vague on enforcement issues, which could lead to ineffectual treaty enforcement mechanisms. 238 As discussed below, however, unique features of the states and industries most affected by this treaty will likely mitigate this potential weakness and result in relatively strong enforcement. A final place in which the POPs Convention may lack detail is in a tracking system to prevent illegal trade in banned pesticides. Again, this concern, if realized, is likely to pose only a minor impediment to effective operation of the treaty regime, since significant incentives for implementation exist.
It may be difficult for other reasons to derive lessons for negotiating future international environmental treaties from the successes of the POPs experience. One reason that the parties were able to reach agreement may have been the particular circumstances of the parties, the global economy, and the fact that substitutes for many POPs are available. In this way, the Stockholm Convention may be similar to the Montreal Protocol, which was able to garner near-complete consensus due to a number of peculiarities. The Montreal Protocol was able to achieve its relative success due to the particular characteristics of the issue, the parties, and the presence of such widespread support for regulating CFCs. 239 Further, as with POPs, the chemicals of concern in the Montreal Protocol, CFCs, were produced by humans, and their uses were widespread, but circumscribed. 240 The potentially affected industries were also generally proponents of regulation, since they were creating substitute products, and they would benefit from the increased demand for them.
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The POPs context is similar. While their uses are also widespread, POPs have specific applications in industry and agriculture. As in the development of the Montreal Protocol, industry was not antagonistic in the POPs context, ostensibly motivated by prospects of marketing and selling more costly substitutes to the banned pesticides. Though these factors may prevent the experience from translating broadly into regimes crafted to deal with other types of environmental problems, they do appear promising for the successful implementation of the POPs Convention.
Despite the singularity of many components of the POPs process, several factors may apply broadly to future multinational environmental treaty negoti-238. See Mintz, supra note 226, at 332. 239. See DeSombre, supra note 93, at 52 (explaining how "remarkably particular" characteristics made the Montreal Protocol possible and may also constrain its applicability to other situations).
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ation. One early lesson is that each stage of a treaty is important, and the way that the treaty progresses from initial meeting to the signing of the final document is of fundamental importance in determining its outcome. 242 Throughout negotiations, extensive participation-by representatives of governments, NGOs, and affected industry-can make all the difference in MEAs. It is also important to maintain this involvement throughout negotiations by taking account of states' limitations and accounting for them through creative provisions. Finally, a focused legal mandate is also needed to keep the treaty negotiation process on track, creating a direction to guide participants.
B. Encouraging Participation-A Way to Success
The lessons that can be drawn from Stockholm begin with the way that the treaty developed, even before the substantive negotiations began. Several novel features of the Convention allowed a broad range of perspectives to be represented at the negotiating table. Early on, UNEP recognized the many limitations to participation in international treaty regimes on the part of developing countries and took steps to overcome these obstacles. Not the least of these involves the expense of fielding teams of negotiators, especially from the smallest and poorest developing countries, whose priorities often involve concerns that are more basic. 243 UNEP addressed these concerns by providing funding to enable officials from developing countries to attend negotiation sessions and preparatory and informational meetings around the world. UNEP also scheduled regional workshops with the same goals in mind, holding two of the five INC sessions in Africa, and one of the two meetings of the Criteria Experts Group in Thailand. 244 These actions helped negotiators recognize the perspectives and balance the needs of both developed and developing countries. As illustrated in the DDT context, negotiators balanced the need to reduce pesticide use against the need to protect populations from malaria, and were able to reach a compromise that promises to be workable when implemented.
developing countries' implementation of their commitments under the agreement contingent upon the provision of financial assistance by developed countries. 251 In this way, the Stockholm Convention utilizes a modern technique in international environmental law, creating a legal relationship between the obligations of developing countries and the financial obligations of developed countries, and including unequivocal language to this effect. 252 In a controversial decision, the negotiators determined that the GEF, which provides financial support to remedy ecological problems, would provide interim operation of the financial arrangements, which they specified in article 13. 253 The Convention includes provisions to "cooperate to provide timely and appropriate technical assistance to developing country Parties. . . .," 254 a function the GEF will also undertake. In the future, it is likely that most MEAs will require technical and financial assistance provisions in order to secure the participation of the world's less developed countries.
A more general and intuitive observation of the POPs negotiations is that the goals of the treaty regime need to be constructed in terms that make sense to the parties negotiating them. For this reason, complete bans of chemicals in some contexts can be counterproductive. This reasoning applies to DDT in the POPs context, because of its ongoing utility in combating malaria; only after parties agreed to ongoing use of DDT for vector control could negotiations proceed. In its final form, the POPs treaty calls for general elimination of DDT production and use, but provides for country-specific exemptions for vector control.
255 Parties wishing to continue using DDT for vector control are required to do in accordance with WHO recommendations and guidelines and only "when locally safe, effective, and affordable alternatives are not available to the Party in question." 256 To ensure oversight, reserving parties must submit periodic reports about their use, explore substitute methods, and periodically evaluate the continued need to employ DDT. 257 Significantly, however, the Con- vention does not include a specific phase-out date for DDT, a provision over which considerable debate took place. 258 As the experience of the POPs Convention has illustrated, however, complete bans can and do make sense in the right context, when appropriate factors are taken into consideration.
Still other lessons can be taken from the form of the treaty itself. It is important to commence MEA negotiations with a focused objective. The way that negotiators developed and carried out a strong legal mandate on POPs holds lessons for future MEAs. By limiting the initial focus to a specific set of "dirty" chemicals, the Stockholm Convention acknowledges the constraints in circumscribing the use of chemicals and focuses its provisions in an in-depth manner, purposely "going deep" in the way it addressed these twelve chemicals, instead of developing a broader toxics treaty. 259 In this way, negotiators avoided the sometimes problematic framework-protocol approach, often employed in international environmental treaties in order to achieve initial consensus on regulatory prerogatives. Once the framework is established, parties negotiate specific protocols on various aspects of the larger problem. This approach has received criticism for failing to secure effective participation, particularly in the notable example of the Kyoto Protocol. 260 By incorporating the precautionary principle and empowering institutions to review the regime's progress, the Stockholm Convention ensures that other chemicals will be added to the initial "dirty dozen," but established clear terms and concrete duties with regard to the first twelve POPs. The Convention also institutionalizes performance by organizing a Conference of the Parties to oversee ongoing issues related to implementation.
D. POPs and the Future
In light of these provisions, it is not surprising that the final agreement was able to secure strong initial support from nearly 120 states, and now claims over 150 signatories. 261 As always, the proof will be in the pudding: the true success of the Convention will be determined by how effectively parties implement the provisions. As is clear from the Bush Administration's incomplete legislative proposal to implement the treaty in the United States, there are many reasons to be tentative in predicting the ultimate success of the global POPs treaty. The international chemical industry, which opposed strong language throughout the process, now lauds the treaty as an important step in cleaning up the global environment. 262 This gives one pause to consider how effective the treaty will be at reducing the earth's toxics burden generally. In addition, broad support for the treaty could be due in part to loopholes in the convention's language, which could prevent effective enforcement.
The significant promise, however, that the treaty presents for the reduction of POPs, and the tremendous will to move forward experienced at the signing in Stockholm, bode well for the future of this convention. Of course, the fate of the treaty will depend upon solid domestic implementation, which in turn will require the continued and increased monitoring that brought many of these issues to bear in the first instance. Recalling the significant public support for and recognition of the need to regulate POPs effectively, this monitoring will probably occur. The likely result is an effective global regime on an especially pernicious set of toxic chemicals. The broad support from nearly all sectors working on the POPs Convention encourages optimism about the future of international POPs control. Further, the lessons that policymakers and others can draw from the experience are many, and implementing these in future MEAs is likely to result in more successful environmental accords overall.
